The 17th package of EU-Russia sanctions

1. The 17th EU sanctions package against Russia – an overview of further changes to EU sanctions law

On 20 May 2025, the EU Member States once again tightened the existing sanctions in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which is contrary to international law.

At the same time, the United Kingdom also significantly tightened its sanctions against Russia, emphasising in its statement that Russia was continuing its war with undiminished ferocity against the Ukrainian civilian population and that the British government had recorded 273 attacks by Russian drones in a single day.

The new EU sanctions package includes the listing of additional ships assigned to the so-called shadow fleet.

We had already pointed out in our article of 5 February 2025 and our comments on the 15th EU sanctions package, which included a comparative analysis of the US sanctions measures, that an expansion of the list of ships would be welcome. In this respect, we consider the measures now taken to be a consistent implementation of further investigative activities by the respective authorities, which allow the ships now listed to be assigned to the shadow fleet.

With reference to our comments on the 12th EU sanctions package, it should be emphasised that this expansion of the sanctions lists is particularly welcome given that the classification of a ship as belonging to the shadow fleet may initially be associated with a certain degree of uncertainty. The expansion of the sanctions lists therefore serves to clarify the situation. With the 17th EU sanctions package, 189 additional ships have been listed, bringing the total number to 342.

It can be said with certainty that this is by no means a complete list of all ships that actually pose new challenges for the international community as part of the so-called shadow fleet.

2. Background: circumvention of sanctions and the oil price cap

Tankers in the shadow fleet are being used to circumvent the ban imposed by the EU and the wider coalition of states seeking to enforce an oil price cap on Russia on transporting or purchasing Russian oil whose price exceeds this cap.

The measures are so broad that they exclude insurance in accordance with standard Western practices.

Considerations regarding the oil price cap have always been caught between the desire not to completely ban trade in Russian oil, so as not to drive up the price of oil, and the desire to reduce Russia’s revenues from oil sales so that Russia has less financial resources available for military spending.

The existence of the shadow fleet of tankers illustrates how complicated it is to influence this market beyond its inherent supply and demand dynamics. Although the risks associated with the shadow fleet are obvious to all coastal states, some states do not seem to consider this risk too high when weighed against the economic losses that would be associated with a halt in Russian oil supplies.

Otherwise, there would be no explanation for why the shadow fleet is able to operate on the world’s oceans as it currently does.

The economic consequences of the shadow fleet’s existence are obvious. For the sake of completeness, we would therefore like to briefly explain at this point that the use of substandard tonnage that has not been properly maintained and is also likely to incur significantly lower insurance costs naturally leads to distortions of competition and higher profit margins. On the other hand, coastal states and their taxpayers face a higher risk of being confronted with the consequences of an oil spill without adequate recourse.

This obvious conflict of interest can no longer be viewed in isolation from the far-reaching geopolitical challenges surrounding the shadow fleet.

Given that the most important route for these tankers runs through the Baltic Sea and the straits of the Öresund and the Great Belt, it is worth considering whether mechanisms already exist to curb these risky activities or how such mechanisms could be developed.

3. Potential for escalation

A closer look is also warranted in light of recent incidents that have highlighted the considerable potential for escalation in dealing with shadow fleet tankers. In a statement on the events involving the tanker ‘Jaguar’ and the violation of NATO airspace by an SU-35 fighter jet, Russia argued that this was a case of defending against piracy in order to justify its behaviour.

This argument is clearly misleading, as it is not apparent how the accusation of piracy, which implies private profit motives, is related to the inspection of the ship ‘Jaguar’. Estonia wanted to inspect this tanker because it was allegedly sailing without a flag. We will address the related questions concerning the assessment of international maritime law in more detail in this article. This is because the number of headlines concerning individual tankers is clearly increasing and there is considerable potential for escalation.

Also concerning Estonia, we should remember the detention of the tanker ‘Kiwala’, which was allegedly sailing without a flag on its way to Ust-Luga, where it has since arrived. There, in Ust-Luga, a tanker loaded with 130,000 tonnes of oil, the Koala, was damaged by several explosions in the ship’s engine room, followed by water ingress.

In Germany, the voyage of the tanker ‘Eventin’ made considerable headlines, and measures against the tanker ‘Green Admire’, a ship flying the Liberian flag and owned by Greek interests, have been reported from Russia.

Following an increase in acts of sabotage against sensitive infrastructure, particularly submarine cables, in the Baltic Sea region, NATO countries have launched Operation Baltic Sentry, which focuses on protecting critical maritime infrastructure.

Not only the incidents surrounding the tanker Eagle S, which was seized by Finland and the damage to submarine cables caused by an anchor, but also the damage to a data cable between Sweden and Latvia and, most recently, another deployment of the Polish navy following suspicious manoeuvres by a tanker near a power cable, illustrate the explosive nature of the shadow fleet’s activities.

4. Considerations on international maritime law

In view of the behaviour of Russia and the states that have the greatest interest in oil imports from Russia, even beyond the limits of the oil price cap, the shadow fleet may give the impression that the high seas are a legal vacuum. This is not the case.

As explained in Meurer’s Dictionary of International Law and Diplomacy, the sea is free from territorial sovereignty, but not from legal sovereignty.

Of central importance today is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982 and ratified by 170 states, including Russia, China and India.

The main features of this convention are various areas of regulation designed to balance the interests of coastal states and other states. The UNCLOS distinguishes between the coastal sea and the exclusive economic zone on the one hand, and the rights on the high seas on the other.

For issues relating to the shadow fleet, this means that they must be assessed partly from the perspective of the area of regulation that concerns their voyage on the high seas and partly from the perspective of the area of regulation of the territorial sea and EEZ. Depending on where the ship is located, it must therefore be assessed whether it is exercising freedom of navigation under Article 87 UNCLOS or the right of innocent passage.

It is undisputed that a state is not obliged to grant rights of passage to ships that are not navigating the sea peacefully. Depending on their intent, various acts of sabotage can be classified in such a way that there is a right to detain these ships. However, such a right cannot be derived in the case of a tanker sailing peacefully but not properly maintained and insured in accordance with usual standards, as long as such a tanker does not call at a port where it would be subject to port state control.

This addresses a core issue with regard to the shadow fleet. All internationally agreed security concepts are not only based on the flag state ensuring effective implementation of these concepts, but also provide for port states to exercise their control rights effectively.

These regulations are also in line with the interests of the states themselves, as port states have no interest in an oil disaster off their coasts.

However, the demand for oil reveals a different approach to standard port state control and import requirements by oil-importing states.

This opens the door to a dangerous consensus, namely a seemingly systematic neglect of flag state responsibilities for the effective implementation of ship safety regulations, coupled with a lack of effective port state controls. The passage of shadow fleet tankers through the Öresund and the Great Belt can therefore be seen as a ticking time bomb. A glimmer of hope that accidents are not deliberately caused is linked to the value of the respective ship’s cargo; it is important for Russia that this trade functions in this way.

It should be noted within the framework of the UNCLOS that freedom of the high seas and thus freedom of navigation is not absolute freedom; in other words, inherent restrictions on the exercise of freedom must be observed.

This is codified in Article 87(2) of the UNCLOS, which raises the question of whether the current practice of oil transport by tankers of the shadow fleet takes due account of the interests of other states.

In our comments on the 16th EU sanctions package, we already referred to IMO Resolution A. 1192 of 6 December 2023, which provides a point of reference for answering this question.

As things stand today, the shadow fleet poses a threat to maritime safety and the environment. We have already addressed the challenges posed by the shadow fleet in our comments on the 12th, 15th and 16th EU sanctions packages.

It is not realistic to seek legal clarification before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg on the rights that individual states can exercise against individual ships in view of the deliberate violations and circumventions of the provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea through the use of this fleet. On the one hand, legal action would have to be taken against the flag state of a specific ship, which would initially be irrelevant for Russia. Secondly, despite the IMO’s efforts to provide a definition in Resolution A. 1192, it will always be necessary to consider in each individual case whether a particular ship against which measures are directed can be attributed to the shadow fleet. It is not clear whether the EU list could have any indicative effect in this regard.

It therefore seems more appropriate to work towards more effective implementation of port state control. In this context, it should not be overlooked that the US has also imposed sanctions directly on a large number of ships, so that ‘secondary sanctions’ against actors trading with these ships cannot be ruled out, at least from the perspective of US sanctions law.

The 17th EU sanctions package provides, among other things, for a comprehensive ban on services for ships in the shadow fleet in accordance with Article 3s of EU Regulation 833/2014. The EU measures mainly cover tankers, but other ships used for military purposes and floating oil production units (FSUs) are also included in the list of entities.

The US government has indicated that it intends to influence the trade in question through punitive tariffs. The US is reportedly seeking to align itself with the EU. For the EU, this raises the ultimate question of whether, in addition to the discussions on transatlantic customs policy, it can afford to engage in tariff disputes with important business partners in Asia.

Given the scale of the war and the suffering of the Ukrainian civilian population, it does not seem far-fetched to hope that Asian countries will reconsider their options and work towards a solution through further diplomatic consultations outside of escalating trade wars.

The extent to which economic incentives for maintaining the current status quo and the use of the shadow fleet can be limited is certainly worth further consideration. This is particularly important given that it must be undesirable to tolerate an increase in profit margins associated with substandard shipping.

5. Overview of further measures

Once again, further individual entries have been made amending EU Regulation 269/2014. As part of the 17th EU sanctions package, a further 17 individuals and 58 organisations/entities have been listed. Furthermore, measures have been adopted to make it more difficult for the Russian arms industry to access raw materials and manufacturing facilities for military use. It is therefore advisable not only for companies in the aerospace industry, but also for those producing dual-use goods, to familiarise themselves thoroughly with the new regulations.

6. Comment

The 17th package of sanctions is a welcome intensification of sanctions measures, focusing on restricting Russia’s military forces and reducing revenues from the oil business. The maritime industry is once again particularly exposed; this should be seen in parallel with the importance of the shadow fleet for the Russian economy and the risks associated with it.

For players in the maritime industry, this means being particularly vigilant to ensure compliance with the sanctions regulations.

This applies to organisational matters and active risk management on land as well as to ship operations in order to mitigate the risks posed by illegitimate actions by the shadow tanker fleet, such as switching off the AIS and concealing GPS data.

Given the detailed nature of the regulations, legal advice should be sought if a need for advice is identified; overview publications cannot replace advice in individual cases. This also applies to this article.

Do you have any further questions on these or other topics? Our experts will be happy to support you with solutions tailored to your individual needs.